Recent conflict between indigenous people and a self-styled indigenous state in Bolivia has brought to the fore some of the paradoxes and contradictions within the concept of indigeneity itself. The contemporary politics of state sponsored indigeneity in Bolivia has as much capacity to create new inequalities as it does to address old ones and there is a conceptual deficit in understanding contemporary indigenous rights claims, in particular, as they relate to the state. I reject Peter Geschiere's (2009) suggestion that one should distinguish between 'autochthony' and 'indigeneity' but am inspired by these arguments to suggest that one needs to make a critical distinction between the kinds of claims different indigenous people make against the state. Of interest here are the consequences of indigeneity being transformed from being a language of resistance to a language of governance. I propose a conceptual distinction between inclusive national indigeneity for the majority which seeks to co-opt the state through accessing the language of governance and a minority concept of indigeneity which needs protection from the state and continues to use indigeneity as a language of resistance. Only by looking at the kinds of claims people make through the rhetoric of indigeneity can we make sense of the current indigenous conflict in Bolivia and elsewhere.
Introduction
In July, 2011, a group of indigenous people representing the ethnic groups of the Tsimanes, Moxetenes and Yuracarés left TIPNIS, the Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Securé with the intention of marching to the capital city of La Paz in order to protest the construction of a road across their territory. On the 25 th of September, the marchers were prevented from continuing by police on the grounds that they could not guarantee their safety from groups protesting in favor of the road and a violent confrontation ensued. Such a march and protest has become almost commonplace in Latin American countries in recent decades as national governments continue to build to roads and drill for oil in indigenous territories. What is surprising in this case is that this occurred in a state which is led by an indigenous president who has placed indigeneity at the very center of how he expresses the legitimacy of his rule and has explicitly created a series of very public rituals to match his rhetoric of having created an indigenous state. His administration introduced a new national constitution giving rights to recognized indigenous communities to manage their own resources and the right to be consulted in areas of development. The confusion is compounded by the fact that those marching in favor of the road were indigenous coca growers and staunch supporters of the President.
In this paper I would like to discuss some of the contradictions at the heart of the new indigenous state in Bolivia. The broader issues, however, relate to our understanding of indigeneity, about its weakness as an anthropological concept as well as a weakness in international law and the way it is understood by the United Nations (UN) and multilateral agencies. Indigeneity may be a useful conceptual tool for understanding conflicts between indigenous people and nation-states where indigenous groups are powerless minorities; they are, I argue, woefully inadequate in understanding conflict between different groups of indigenous people within a nation state, much less between indigenous people and an indigenous state.
First we need to tackle the thorny problem of what indigenous people are and as many scholars have noted it is very difficult to avoid falling into an essentialist trap (Barnard 2006; Bowen 2000; Gausset et al. 2011; Kenrick and Lewis 2004; Kuper 2003a; Paradies 2006; Ramos 2003; Saugestad 2004; Warren and Jackson 2002) .
Adam Kuper some years ago sparked a controversy over the anthropological use of the term 'indigenous people' (Kuper 2003a; 2003b; which has occasioned numerous responses to his original Current Anthropology article within the pages of that journal (Current Anthropology 45, 2, 2004, and 47, 1, 2006) as well as some others Lewis 2004, Barnard 2006) . Much of Kuper's initial paper and a large proportion of the responses concern themselves with Central and Southern Africa and, in particular, the way in which 'indigenous people' refers to hunter gatherers. As a consequence much of the thrust of his argument and the numerous rejoinders are largely irrelevant to Latin American concerns. 1 Kuper is, however, surely right in pointing out that there is an arbitrariness in distinguishing between one set of marginal peasants and another on the basis of some putative condition of indigeneity or marginal lifestyle in the past and echoes a set of concerns raised by others such as John Gledhill (1999) and André Béteille (1998) .
There are many peoples in Latin America who readily conform to the broad description of those described by Kenrick and Lewis (2004) in their rejoinder to Kuper in that they are small groups marginalized by the state who are not or were not historically, settled farmers; and indeed some contemporary lowland groups are sometimes described as 'living in the stone age'. 'relatively easy' to say who is indigenous in Latin America, as is sometimes suggested (Barnard 2006: 8; Kenrick and Lewis 2004: 6) , who is and who isn't indigenous and what it means to be indigenous in Latin America is highly variable, context-specific and changes over time (e.g. Cadena 2000; Canessa 2006; Harris et al. 1995; Martínez Novo 2006) . In fact, many of the more same issues that face scholars of indigeneity in Africa (e.g. Hodgson 2011; Lee 2003; Wilmsen 1989) and Asia (e.g. Li 2000; Shah 2010; Tsing 2004) , such as the role of the state in constructing indigeneity, the problems of homogenizing indigenous identity, and the apparent arbitrariness in the ways some people are included and others excluded, can easily be reproduced in Latin America.
In an earlier work (2007) I suggested that the best way to understand indigeneity was in terms of a 'claim to justice', one based on awareness of historical injustice the consequences of which have been inherited by contemporary people. This way of understanding indigeneity fits in well with the growing understanding of indigeneity 1 Kuper mentions the large and successful indigenous movements of Latin America only once in his original paper (2003a: 391) and then only in the most tangential way.
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Alcida Ramos (2003: 397-8) , one of the few Latin Americanists to comment on Kuper's paper directs her discussion to Amazonian examples.
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That is, sedenterization was developing in the Andean about a thousand years before it was in Britain. Victorian evolutionists had a much more recent hunter-gather ancestry than native Andeans.
as a globalized discourse of rights which are accessed by peoples engaged in local struggles. Anna Tsing suggests that indigeneity is a 'universal' concept, one which has the ability to spread across cultures and engage with large numbers of different people. These universals cause 'frictions' (Tsing 2004) as they travel, producing new relations, new alliances and new ideas. There is an inherent instability to these travelling universals and the frictions they produce (Tsing 2004: 1-13) and it is such a friction that is producing multiple ways of understanding indigeneity in contemporary Bolivia which often appear at loggerheads with each other.
There can be no doubt that discourses of indigeneity can be very enabling for marginalized peoples who otherwise would not have access to international courts and global mobilizations of interest groups or what Tania Murray Li (2000) has called the 'indigenous people's slot'. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have had a considerable role in creating such alliances and developing politically engaged discourses of indigeneity as otherwise disempowered groups make claims to justice against, typically, the states in which they find themselves (Escárcega 2010; Greene 2009; Hathaway 2010; Li 2000; Martínez Novo 2006; Sapignoli 2012; Sieder 2002) and, as such, indigenous movements are often seen as essentially progressive.
Nevertheless the impulse to be strategically essentialist (Spivak 1988 ) is sometimes difficult to resist when such a discourse is required by international funding agencies (Laurie et al. 2002) or by the very nature of national political discourses (Canessa 2007; Wade 1997) . Indigenous groups may find it irresistible to meet outsiders' expectations about a primordial and mystical relation to the land or a highly essentialized view of culture when to do so may open up the only political space to discuss land rights, autonomy and so on. These discourses may not only misrepresent the actual views and practices of people but may arbitrarily create divisions between people. A number of anthropologists, particularly those working in Africa and India (Kuper 2005 , Geschiere 2009 , Karlson 2003 , Shah 2010 have noted that filling the 'indigenous slot' is not always conducive to progressive politics and, moreover, may actually harm the interests of the people they are supposed to serve.
There is an inherent tension between the universality of indigeneity as a powerful and enabling globalized context and the fact that the discourse of indigeneity is one that lays claim to a cultural and temporal specificity: it always argues for a particular status for those attached to a particular place since a particular time. The attachment to ultimately arbitrary axes of space and time almost inevitably lead to essentialist discourses to account for why one people should have rights over a particular territory on the ground that they have occupied it since a particular date. These frictions and tensions are not only creating new hierarchies between indigenous people but they are exposing contradictions at the heart of the nation-state and conflict between people who one might otherwise expect to be in alliance.
At root is the question: are indigenous people all the descendants of those who lived within the current nation-state boundaries at the time of colonization or are they those who define their attachment to a much smaller territory occupied in a more recent historical period? Under current international law, e.g. International Labor Organization
Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and the practice of international agencies (World Bank and the UN), indigeneity is explicitly defined in terms of selfidentification, independent nation states, and occupation since the time of colonization.
These issues may not matter very much when we are talking about the efforts of a cultural distinct people who speak an indigenous language, occupy a clearly defined territory and are in a struggle against a state controlled by people of European descent.
They become quite important, however, when indigenous people are arguably the majority of the population and the faces in the cabinet, including the President's, are indigenous; they begin to matter even more when the state styles itself as being 'indigenous'.
Evo Morales and the Indigenous State
There can be little doubt that Bolivia is an exemplary example of what has been described as indigenous awakening (Albó 1991; Bengoa 2000; Brysk 2000; Stavenhagen 2002; Wearne 1996) in Latin America and that Evo Morales' winning of the 2005 presidential election is both a product of this 'indigenous awakening' and a contributory factor in setting social and political conditions for an indigenous identity to be increasingly acceptable.
It is important to note, however, that even though mobilization by indigenous people increased following neoliberal reforms in the 1990s many of these people mobilizing
were not doing so as indigenous people per se but, rather, as Bolivian citizens who happened to be indigenous. This is the central argument of Nancy Postero who suggests that the neoliberal reforms had the largely unintended effect of creating a new sense of citizens' entitlement and struggle:
[I]t is clear that even though the faces on the frontlines of the demonstrations were overwhelmingly Indian […], 'The Bolivian people' [which the marchers claimed to represent] did not signify indigenous -or more specifically, it did not only signify indigenous. (Postero 2007: 221) desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series, No. 22, 2012 | 13 This is an important point because it marks a significant shift in indigenous people being on the margins of the nation state and, at best, represented by mestizos and creoles to a growing position where they were considered best able to defend the national patrimony. To what extent can Bolivia be described as an indigenous state? It is formally a multicultural and plurinational state but the new constitution privileges certain indigenous citizens over others, in particular the kind of citizen described in the constitution as 'originary peasant indigenous' (sic). I will come back to this citizen in a moment but first I want to outline the ways in which the Morales government has placed indigeneity at the very center of the way in which it presents itself to its citizens. 'Vivir bien significa vivir en armonía con todo y con todos, entre seres humanos y con nuestra madre Tierra, implica por tanto trabajar por la dignidad de todas y todos. Y hoy día es más importante todavía saber compartir, saber distribuir la riqueza de manera equitativa. Lo que es del pueblo, es para el pueblo. Democratizar la economía, por eso nacionalizamos los recursos naturales para que esos recursos económicos vuelvan al pueblo boliviano' (Translation by author). (Goodman 2007) .
One of the perhaps more bizarre manifestations of this new statecraft is the President's participation in mass marriage ceremonies, most recently in May 2011 (Postero 2011) .
In this ceremony, over 350 couples were married in an 'ancestral' and 'traditional' ceremony in which the President was the sponsor, i.e., the padrino of all the couples who hailed from eleven different ethnic groups and included individuals from Cuba and Nicaragua. We can leave aside, for the moment, the depth of this tradition but what is striking here is that in this ceremony which was intending to 'being a radical process of depatriarchalization of the colonial, liberal and neoliberal family' 7 the head of state is presenting himself as the indigenous godfather of the nation.
As Postero (2011) 
3.

Indigenous Citizenship
Postero (2007) Americans are experiencing today (Kymlicka 1995; Postero 2007; Stavenhagen 2002; Yashar 1998) , and in sharp contrast to an historical context where being indigenous ipso facto implied a lack of citizenship. María Elena García goes further in her analysis in proposing an indigenous citizenship where 'cultural difference is no longer a criterion for exclusion, but one of inclusion in a multicultural political community ' (2005: 165) .
The contemporary state in Bolivia has rejected the politics of assimilation in favor of a recognition of cultural and ethnic diversity and moved indigenous identity from the margins of the nation state to its very heart: the indigenous is now the paradigmatic citizen (Canessa 2006 ).
This has partly come about because in Morales' Bolivia, political legitimacy rests on being indigenous (although this is, of course, contested). On many occasions Morales has positioned the indigenous as being the best place from which to defend and protect the nation's natural resources and to push for social justice on a very wide front; indigeneity provides his government with the legitimacy to rule and a platform from which to protect the nation against cultural and economic globalization (even as he embraces many of its key aspects); in short, indigeneity is the foundation of a new nationalism. This nationalism is, however, founded on a double discourse: the Bolivian nation is indigenous on the world stage as it presents itself in a struggle against global capitalism; internally, however, some people are clearly more indigenous than others.
In (2005) has noted that even in Colombia, which has a very small indigenous population, indigenous groups have successfully managed to change the definition of citizenship in that country, and I would argue that it is even more strongly the case in Bolivia.
The Bolivian constitution thus introduces a new political subject, the indigenous originary peasant. It raises the question, however, as to why such a clumsy term was used. Why not just use indigenous? The Spanish word indígena has been used for centuries in Bolivia but in recent decades, and especially after the 1952 Revolution which decreed that all peasant indians would thenceforth be called campesinos, the term indígena has largely been used to describe marginal lowland forest dwellers.
Highlanders, even those living very 'traditional' lifestyles did not, until very recently, use the word indígena as a self-description. In fact, when I first started conducting fieldwork in the Andes in the early 1990s, none of my interlocutors described themselves as 'indigenous' although today, many will, by making explicit reference to the politics of the Morales administration. Its contemporary use is confusing: on the one hand it often refers to lowland indigenous people, and on the other it refers to a broad set of values most clearly associated with and articulated by the Morales administration.
One of the paradoxes of this contemporary situation is that many highlanderswho at least in certain contexts identify as indigenous -will look down on lowland (Yashar 2005: 6, 47-48) , the recent constitution has changed it once again.
The new constitution defines thirty-six indigenous nations and languages and explicitly aims at establishing indigenous values if not people at the center of the nation-state.
4.
Differentiated Indigenous Citizens
The contemporary Bolivian state explicitly celebrates diversity by recognizing the pluricultural nature of the state and in, for example, translating buen vivir in various indigenous languages for the constitution. In practice, however, the state is much more keen on celebrating highland values than lowland ones. The government's insistence on spreading the Aymara New Year across the country is a good example. On a more concrete level is the support or even active encouragement by the state for colonization of lowland areas by highlanders.
The collapse of mining in the 1980s began a massive movement of population from the highlands to the lowlands. Some of these were to the traditional coca growing areas of the yungas, but very large numbers of migrants went to areas such as the Chapare region and began cultivating coca leaf. In this period, there were very few viable opportunities for poor Aymara and Quechua people from the highlands. The
Chapare was known as a frontier territory but it was not uninhabited. In the 1950s and speaks to a dynamic population engaged in market activities seeking economic growth, rather than one which seeks to sacrifice economic growth in favor of buen vivir.
There is a tension, however, in the constitutional insistence that indigenous people have control over their recognized territories, and may choose to refuse exploitation on their lands, and the perceived need for economic growth based on extractive industries and intensive agriculture. One of the clearest political problems facing the government is not that there is oil exploitation in the lowlands, but that there is oil exploitation in the lowlands in areas of greatest political opposition to the government. Their defense of indigenous communities' rights to resist oil exploitation changes when the oil in question is in departments such as La Paz which although considered a highland department has large tracts of land in the lowlands.
5.
The Mosetén Case
On The key issue, however, is not the state's lack of fulfillment of its promises, but firstly that it follows in a long tradition of discounting indigenous people's voices on the grounds that they are manipulated by NGOs, and secondly that it subordinates indigenous people's interests to that of the state, a state led by an 'indigenous-popular and peasant movement'. The state, in the eyes of the Vice-President, represents and articulates the 'collective interest of all the people' but this state has legitimacy because of its indigenous credentials. Morales successfully articulated a set of issues and interests such as gas and justice as indigenous ones, which got him elected on a broad platform, but he has then moved to subordinate all indigenous interests to that of the state. His performance of state ritual in archaeological sites and apparently innocuous events such as mass marriages are actually important in his construction of a state based on indigenous legitimacy but which, paradoxically, subordinates indigenous interests. And so, in his own words: 'Amazonia without oil' is a slogan for foreign interests'.
Morales continues in that interview:
The right uses some of our brothers to oppose us to suggest things which are so fundamental as to be non-negotiable: how is it possible that all the state lands and national parks be in the hands of some indigenous brothers; that all the logging concessions, once recovered, fall into the hands of the small groups of the Bolivian indigenous movement. I feel it is a form of opposition to the policies we are developing (translation by author). (Cambio, 25 June 2010) Morales here is echoing some of the themes that his Vice-President discussed. The interests of the (indigenous) state cannot be sacrificed to the interests of small groups of marginal people with large tracts of land despite having just established such a right in the constitution. Among lowlanders, there is consequently considerable opposition to the indigenous president who is seen as favoring highlanders against them.
This leads us to a fundamental contradiction in Bolivia's politics of indigeneity (cf.
Postero 2012):
(1) The Morales Government makes an explicit commitment to alternative models of development, whereby 'living well' is prioritized over economic growth. but, rather, who should control it, as well as how the resources and revenues will be distributed.
6.
Indigenous Colonists
The globalized concept explicitly presents indigenous people as being subjects of colonization and many scholars have argued for a productive engagement with concepts of indigeneity precisely because it is a means through which relatively powerless people can make justice claims. Indeed, as I have argued (2008), a claim to indigeneity is first and foremost a claim to justice. Justice and powerlessness are, however, relative concepts and there is a danger is assuming that indigenous people are always and everywhere in the right. Béteille (1998: 90) warns us of this when he asks: 'Is there now such an essentialist view of indigenous people in which they carry their identity with them wherever they go and whatever they do?' How does such a rhetorical question shed light on the situation in Bolivia? The first issue to consider is whether an indigenous identity travels and surely it must: if the state is going to recognize indigenous citizens it must surely do so whether they live in the jungle or in the suburbs in the same way it recognizes other minorities; and surely one is indigenous whatever one does.
The history of Bolivia can easily be described as the history of the oppression of the descendants of pre-European populations in the service of white-dominated agribusiness and mining. There can be surely no issue in celebrating the taking of power from the white elite by a government which represents the indigenous majority.
The problem arises, however, when the concept of indigeneity obscures internal differentiation and, to take a specific Bolivian point, when highland peasants arrive as indigenous citizens to occupy land that is unused or underused in the relatively sparsely populated eastern lowlands. Unused, that is, from the perspective of the colonists; not exactly unused from the perspective of the equally indigenous people who live there.
That is, it is not enough to assert that 'indigenous people are better understood as those who are discriminated against; they are rarely the ones discriminating against others' (Kenrick and Lewis 2004) because it leaves us with no critical perspective to understand when indigenous people do discriminate against others.
In a recent trip to the lowland town of Rurrenabaque, I spoke to many Aymara and Quechua migrants who arrived mostly since the opening of the road to La Paz in the 1980s which opened the area up for settlement. Today, Rurrenabaque is dominated by Aymara and Quechua shopkeepers. The idea that Aymara and Quechua migrants civilize the lowlands is a fairly consistent theme across the region.
Another trader, Marcelino, gave me another, fairly typical account but adds an important gender element:
Oh yes, I have a wife. She is in Santa Cruz but I also have a wife here, a young girl. She is 22 (Marcelino is 45). I have a child with her. The people here are very simple. Before I came twenty years ago there was nothing here. We have brought civilization. They don't understand. In those days they would just give you a woman for twenty pesos. (Laughter) It is very easy to take a woman here.
(translated from Aymara by the author)
The juxtaposition of colonization and the taking of indigenous women is not coincidental;
is has been, in fact, both an image and practice of conquest since the arrival of the Spanish (Canessa 2012a) . The difference here is that it is an Aymara who is invoking this kind of relationship, inserting himself into a colonial relationship as colonizer rather than colonized. As we will see below, the President himself is by no means immune from this kind of language. It is not, however, simply a matter of language since marrying into an indigenous community will give access to land rights as well.
Whereas in the past having a non-indigenous father gave certain advantages, now the opposite is often the case, since it is through the indian mother that one can gain access to territorial rights. In many cases, the same people remain in power (López 2012 ), but instead of legitimizing their positions through their fathers or grandfathers, they do so through their mothers.
Despite state recognition of indigenous land titles, new migrants use their indigeneity to colonize on the grounds that they too are indigenous (López 2012 ) and the state recognition of an indigenous territory arguably increases exposure to colonists rather than protecting locals from them.
The argument of being indigenous as well, and thus having a right to settling in whichever indigenous territory they choose, highlights the missing mechanism and yet necessity for a legal or even conceptual distinction between indigenous groups. This example also demonstrates how certain indigenous groups are perceived -whether by themselves or by others -to have more legitimacy and power than other groups.
Thus, in overlooking fundamental differences between indigenous groups, the state is not only failing to recognize the hierarchy of power between indigenous cultures but is actually exacerbating it: 'Recognition by power can, and increasingly does, involve as many problems as the neglect and marginalization that comes from an absence of state interest' (Dombrowski 2002 (Dombrowski : 1071 .
It also points to a scalar issue when considering indigenous issues and identity. Clearly, in some contexts, highlanders are adopting the view that they are indigenous wherever they may be in the country and they, as indigenous people, have the right to occupy 
7.
The TIPNIS
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Case
In May 2010, a meeting uniting community-level leaders from throughout the territory, as well as the various Sub-centrals and other organizations, issued a joint declaration stating against the building of a road through the territory:
[O]pening this highway would present a threat to our life as peoples who inhabit TIPNIS due to the loss of the natural resources and all the biodiversity upon which the Moxeños, Yuracarés, and Chimanes sustain their culture and life:
a life and culture we have lived in our territory since before the creation of the Bolivia and will continue to live in the future.
Citing this and other reasons, the meeting voted to:
[O]verwhelmingly and non-negotiably reject the construction of the Villa Tunari -San Ignacio de Moxos highway and of any highway segment that would affect our territory.
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The road is part of a continent-wide infrastructural investment by Brazil which is providing almost all of the funding for the road. From a more local perspective, the road is important because it connects the Chapare, the coca growing area, with Brazil, without having to go through Santa Cruz, which is the prime locus of opposition to
Morales. The road through TIPNIS will also open the area for further colonization by coca growers from the Chapare. This colonization is illegal, but the state is already unable or unwilling to stop it. There is no question that local people understand that intensive colonization will be the first major consequence of the road. It is not surprising, then, that the coca growers are fully in support, and so Morales declared on June 30:
'Like it or not, we are going to build this road.' (Los Tiempos 2011a)
The representatives of TIPNIS argued, citing the constitution, that the road could not be built against their wishes but Morales argued in October:
They want the consultation to be binding. That's impossible; it's nonnegotiable.
The constitution and international law mandate previous consultation, and we will always respect that, but letting a group of families tell us what to do would mean paralyzing all our work on electrification, hydrocarbons and industries. the Yuracaré women so that they won't oppose the building of the road. He immediately asked: All in favor? and applause was heard from the assembled.
(La Razón 2011, translation by the author)
Conclusions
Indigeneity always implies a relationship with the state (cf. Aparicio and Blaser 2008; Dombrowksi 2002; Li 2000; Urban and Scherzer 1991; Shah 2010) . It is not simply that international law and convention explicitly frames indigenous peoples as being subjects of an independent state, but that indigenous rights claims are almost always against states and pursued through national rather than international courts. If we eschew essentialist notions of indigeneity and see it as principally a rights discourse based on a particular relationship to space and time and an historical sense of injustice, then it is clear that it is a relationship with a state that defines indigeneity.
In a recent book, Alpa Shah (2010) desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series, No. 22, 2012 | 29 The problem then arises in how we distinguish between different rights claims. In a recent book and series of articles Peter Geschiere and colleagues (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000; Geschiere 2009; Gausset 2008) have proposed a conceptual distinction between autochthony and indigeneity. His inspiration was the similarity between discourses of autochthony in West Africa and the Netherlands and Belgium.
In many ways it is entirely inappropriate for discussing the Bolivian case because
Latin Americans very rarely use the word; but the conceptual distinctions Geschiere and others make may still be useful in understanding the conflict in Bolivia today. In
Geschiere's schema, both autochthony and indigeneity are discourses of belonging but with important differences. Autochthons are settled, often in the majority and make claims on the state against those made by others, these others being settlers or, we might add, other minority groups. Indigenous people are best understood in terms of their marginality, often unsettled, who make a very different set of claims against the state which is about preserving claims to land and asserting a cultural difference.
Quentin Gausset et al. (2011: 139) summarize the distinction thus: indigenous people are marginalized whereas autochthons are dominant but fear marginalization.
In their recent summary of these debates, Gausset et al. (2011) pose the question as to whether autochthony and indigeneity are 'false twins'. This question in their title remains rhetorical and is never answered. There are two problems with opposing autochthony and indigeneity in this way: the first is that the terms are too vague and unstable; in any case, the term is almost never used in Spanish or Anglophone America; the second problem is that the argument presupposes that there are some people who are autochthons and other who are not; that is, that they can be distinguished in a systematic way. What is clear is that Morales and his government are articulating views more resonant with autochthony movements in Europe and Africa than those of marginalized indigenous groups struggling against the state. This accounts for the otherwise bizarre fact that Morales has his admirers among groups such as German neo-Nazis. 
The Discourse of Indigeneity in Bolivia
Rather than get bogged down in a sterile debate, I suggest that it is more important to make distinctions between different claims of belonging and different claims against the state. The claims of coca growers, landless peasants, and some urban groups are similar to some of the autochthonous discourses described by scholars, but these people are clearly both subaltern as well as in the majority. These are, perhaps, the are best positioned to invoke the abstract symbolization of earth deities and indigeneity in the broad ecumenical sense and are most able to extract resources from the state.
I was very surprised recently to hear a mestizo peasant from a community well known for its historical antipathy towards indians describe himself to me as an Aymara and the enthusiasm of creoles and mestizos for celebrating the Aymara New Year. The Aymara peasants surrounding the town of Sorata, who do not celebrate the Aymara New Year, are puzzled by some of the descriptions of the Pachamama as the national symbol of struggle for natural resources and are perplexed when a national politician described natural gas as her fart (Felipe Quispe, interview with author). It cannot be assumed that even in the highlands those who are most rooted in traditional rural lifeways will be the most comfortable with national indigeneity; in fact, it speaks most clearly to a very different constituency.
There is no doubt, however, that such dissonance is most clearly heard among lowland indigenous people. They, too, have a discourse of belonging but may find themselves pitted against the state which is seeking resources for the majority. In fact, the President and ministers may show open irritation at the potential for small indigenous groups to frustrate the states plans for economic growth and development. This frustration echoes many of the concerns of 'autochtonous' groups in Europe and Africa who are concerned about the 'special rights' of minority groups whom they see as impeding national development and prejudicing the rights of the majority. These minority groups are also negotiating a relationship with the state but are principally seeking protection from the state rather than to co-opt the state for their own ends, as is arguably the case for coca growers. They are also seeking protection from highland colonists who, even as they might sometimes describe themselves as indigenous, have little patience for the lifestyle of forest dwellers they see as idle and unproductive.
Implications of Bolivia for Theorizing Indigeneity
International law and multilateral agencies in defining indigeneity in terms of nation states have a very weak conceptual framework at best to comprehend inter-indigenous conflict that I have been describing. As ever more people are identifying as indigenous and indigeneity becomes increasingly used to articulate a wide range of claims for justice we need more sophisticated concepts the better to distinguish between these claims. The distinction between autochthony and indigeneity cannot sustain a critical analysis in this context but it does point to a first step in making distinctions between them although I do think a distinction between autochthons and indigenes is a dead end. It is, moreover, not enough to recognize the plurality of indigenous cultures; we need to explore more systematically the kinds of relationships indigenous discourses demand of the state. The Bolivian case points to a number of interesting tensions and contradictions which occur when indigeneity shifts from being a language of opposition to the language of governance; from when it moves from articulating the discourses of vulnerable minorities to those of national majorities. 
